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REAL PROPERTY-EMINENT DOMAIN
-TIME

FOR FIXING

SUPER-HIGHWAY

DAMAGES-

CONSTRUCTION.

As a result of the extensive super-highway construction throughout
our nation, many eminent domain problems have recently arisen. The resulting condemnation proceedings have activated many almost dormant
problems in this area of the law. This Comment will suggest a course of
procedure in condemnation proceedings for super-highway construction.
The present state of the law and its inadequacies when applied to this relatively new mode of construction will be examined in detail.
Many of the issues and problems which confront the courts at the
present time were raised originally in the pre-Revolutionary War era of
private turnpike construction. However, it has become apparent tlat the
legal principles and' procedural rules that were used to settle disputes in
that period were not designed to cope with the problems raised by our
modern urban and rural development. Furthermore, the law governing
eminent domain proceedings at a municipal level is unsatisfactory since
condemnation at that level is carried on with an eye toward the local scene,
whereas modern turnpikes are integral parts of tremendous interstate systems. Another source of law which might be thought applicable to the
problem at hand is that which grew up with the construction of the railroads. Again, however, the rules are unsatisfactory, since most of the
railroads were built through barren, undeveloped lands. Furthermore, most
of this land was owned by the federal government. Modern turnpikes,
on the other hand, usually cut through privately owned land which is intensively developed. Condemnation by the federal government is probably
the nearest thing to proceedings resulting from turnpike construction. But
even here there is a basic difference. Condemnation by the Attorney
General or a government agency usually involves the acquiring of blocks of
land in one particular area, whereas thruway construction involves the
dissection of entire states. Hence, some new procedures are to be desired.
One of the chief problems raised by this road building is the question
of compensation to the landowner whose property is taken by the state.
While compensation is guaranteed by the Constitution, it is the computation of the amount of damages that creates the major problems. There
are two principal facets to this issue: (1) the point in time at which the
valuation of the land is to be determined; (2) the problem of determining
just what factors are to be included in the total compensation figure. This
Comment will deal primarily with the former.
It is well established that a taking of private property by the state
for public use on payment of just compensation is within constitutional
limitations. The power of eminent domain was a well-recognized function
of government when the Constitution was adopted.' However, the ques1. Aldridge v. Tuscumbia, C. & D. R. R., 2 Stew. & P. 199 (Ala. 1832); Lewis
& Clark County v. Nett, 81 Mont. 261, 263 Pac. 418 (1928) ; Smith v. Cameron,
106 Ore. 1, 210 Pac. 716 (1922); 10 R. C. L. 16 (1916).
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tion of just what is a taking, and what is just compensation is not so well
settled. The traditional rule of damages set down by the courts is that
damages accrue to the landowner when his property is taken; but by
itself, this statement is, at best, a hollow principle. For, while the courts
continually echo this principle, 2 and further agree that a taking occurs
when there is an interruption or restraint of the common and necessary
use and enjoyment of the property by the owner," it is the application of
these principles that causes uncertainty and speculation in this area of the
law. This Comment is aimed primarily at those cases where the courts
found that interests in property had been taken, and it is designed to
present the subject in a positive light.
I.
TYPES OF PROPERTY INTERESTS GIVING RISE TO A RIGHT OF
COMPENSATION.

The law does not require that land in the, tangible sense be taken in
order to give rise to a right of compensation in the owner. 4 Consequently,
the landowner may recover damages in many cases where his rights have
been merely restricted as well as where his property rights have been
directly affected by ordinances. The former situation often arises when
building lines are established 1 or when zoning ordinances have an adverse
effect on existing uses." A typical situation in which property rights are
2. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); Danforth v. United States,
308 U.S. 271 (1939); United States v. Johns, 146 F.2d 92 (9th Cir. 1945) ; Love
v. United States, 141 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1944) ; United States ex rel. TVA v. 7.2
Acres of Land in Sullivan County, Term., 117 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Tenn. 1953);
Dore v. United States, 119 Ct. Cl. 560, 97 F. Supp. 239 (1951); Tigar v. Mystic
River Bridge Authority, 329 Mass. 514, 109 N.E.2d 148 (1952)
May v. Boston,
158 Mass. 21, 32 N.E. 902 (1892) ; Application of Westchester County, 204 Misc.
1031, 127 N.Y.S.2d 24 (Sup. Ct. 1953) ; In re Certain Lands on the North Shore
of the Hudson River, 127 Misc. 710, 217 N.Y. Supp. 544 (Sup. Ct. 1926) ; In re
Hamilton Place, 67 Misc. 191, 122 N.Y. Supp. 660 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
3. Keith v. Drainage Dist. No. 7 of Poinsett County, 183 Ark. 384, 36 S.W.2d
59 (1931); Inhabitants of Lynnfield v. Inhabitants of Peabody, 219 Mass. 322,
106 N.E. 977 (1914); Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247 (1852) ; Big Rapids v. Big
Rapids Mfg. Co., 210 Mich. 158, 177 N.W. 284 (1920); Morrison v. Clackamas
County, 141 Ore. 564, 18 P.2d 814 (1933) ; In re Sansom Street in the City of
Philadelphia, 293 Pa. 483, 143 AtI. 134 (1928); Gasque v. Town of Conway, 194
S.C. 15. 8 S.E.2d 871 (1940).
4. Keith v. Drainage Dist. No. 7 of Poinsett County, 183 Ark. 384, 36 S.W.2d
59 (1931); Liddick v. Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942); Ashland v. Queen, 254 Ky. 329, 71 S.W.2d 650 (1934); Big Rapids v. Big Rapids
Mfg. Co.. 210 Mich. 158, 177 N.W. 284 (1920); Morrison v. Clackamas County,
141 Ore. 564, 18 P.2d 814 (1933) ; In re Sansom Street in the City of Philadelphia,
293 Pa. 483, 143 Atl. 134 (1928); Gasque v. Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 8
S.E.2d 871 (1940).
5. In re Sansom Street in the City of Philadelphia, 293 Pa. 483, 143 Atd. 134
(1928).
6. Gasque v. Town of Conway, 194 S.C. 15, 8 S.E.2d 871 (1940).
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directly affected is that which arises when natural water courses are
diverted for use in various public projects,7 or where a viaduct is built
over an existing street resulting in a decrease in market value of the property adjoining the street.8 Again this problem arises when the closing of
a street obstructs the abutting owners' right of egress and ingressY With
reference to the latter situation the Supreme Court of Georgia has held
that a "damaging" rather than a "taking" was present when a bridge was
constructed in such a manner that entrance to the adjoining property was
made less convenient. 10 The distinction appears to be of little utility since
compensation was awarded for the rights infringed. It is worth noting
that when an already established easement, as a street, is further burdened
by the exercise of eminent domain powers, such as the laying of street
railway tracks, additional compensation is granted to the owner of the
servient estate." In accord with these decisions are those holding that
where the actual taking of a portion of land causes damage to the part
retained by the owner, such injury must be compensated for in arriving
12
at the total damage figure.
II.
WHAT CONSTITUTES

A TAKING?

A.
Condemnation by Counties and Municipalities.
There is a great deal of disagreement among the courts over the
question of just what action on the part of a governmental unit will constitute a taking so as to give the property owner a cause of action for damages. Basically, there are two approaches to the problem. The New
York courts have usually held that the filing of a location chart, of itself,
is insufficient to constitute a taking of the property in question. 13 In
substantial agreement with this view are those courts which have stated
that the passage of an ordinance closing a street,' 4 or the laying out of a
right of way in the planning of a highway '5 is also insufficient to establish
7. Keith v. Drainage Dist. No. 7 of Poinsett County, 183 Ark. 384, 36 S.W.2d
59 (1931) ; Morrison v. Clackamas County, 141 Ore. 564, 18 P.2d 814 (1933).
8. Ashland v. Queen, 254 Ky. 329, 71 S.W.2d 650 (1934).
9. Liddick v. Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942).
10. Hurt v. Atlanta, 100 Ga. 274, 28 S.E. 65 (1892).
11. McCammon & Lang Lumber Co. v. Trinity & B. V. Ry., 104 Tex. 8, 133

S.W. 247 (1911).
12. Town of Ayden v. Lancaster, 197 N.C. 556, 150 S.E. 40 (1929); Western
Carolina Power Co. v. Hayes, 193 N.C. 104, 136 S.E. 353 (1927); Blankenship v.
State, 160 Wash. 514, 295 Pac. 480 (1931) ; Strouds Creek & M.R.R. v. Herold,
131 W. Va. 45, 45 S.E.2d 513 (1947).
13. Benedict v. New York, 98 Fed. 789 (2d Cir. 1899); New York Central &
H.R.R. v. State, 37 App. Div. 57, 55 N.Y. Supp. 685 (3d Dep't 1899) ; In re New
York Dep't of Public Parks, 60 N.Y. 319 (1875).
14. Whitaker v. Phoenixville Borough, 141 Pa. 327, 21 Atl. 604 (1891).
15. North Carolina State Highway Comm'n v. Young, 200 N.C. 603, 158 S.E.
91 (1931).
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the right of compensation in the landowner. These decisions were reasoned from the principle that there is no taking, justifying compensation,
until an entry is made on the land and it is occupied with the intent to
start the proposed project. 16 Damages are then computed from that date.
The same rule was followed where an ordinance set out a future plan for
the construction of streets,'17 where property owners received a notice to
remove buildings by a stated date,' 8 where statutes authorized the construction of a project, 19 and where funds were authorized for such a
project. ° These courts further refused to hold that a taking had occurred
where the filed location for a public project was too vague in its specifications, 21 and where a statute was passed establishing the location of a
harbor line.22 The same result was achieved where resolutions were
23
passed stating that certain land would be required for public purposes,
and where a map which recommended future eminent domain proceedings
was approved by the legislature.2 4 However, in all of these cases the
courts recognized that a taking, with its usual right to compensation,
would occur when the proposed plans went into construction and the land
was actually occupied. On the other hand, courts adhering to the second
view have held that the passage of an ordinance relating to restrictions on
the use of property, or an appropriation of such property, is sufficient to
constitute a taking, and, consequently, give the landowner a right to compensation. Illustrative of this view is the situation where the passage of
an ordinance closing a street was held to give those whose property rights
were affected an immediate right to damages.2 5 The court reasoned that
the ordinance terminated all rights of the abutting landowners as of the
date of passage of the ordinance, though the street might not be physically
16. Benedict v. New York, 98 Fed. 789 (2d Cir. 1899) ; Spaulding v. Arlington,
126 Mass. 492 (1879); Eaton v. Boston, C. & M.R.R., 51 N.H. 504, 12 Am. Rep.
147 (1872) ; New York Central & H.R.R. v. State, 37 App. Div. 57, 55 N.Y. Supp.
685 (3d Dep't 1899); North Carolina State Highway Comm'n v. Young, 200 N.C.
603, 158 S.E. 91 (1931) ; In re Appropriation of Easement for Highway Purposes,
90 Ohio App. 471, 107 N.E.2d 387 (1951) ; Whitaker v. Phoenixville Borough, 141
Pa. 327, 21 Atl. 604 (1891); Bate v. Philadelphia, N. & P.R.R., 1 Mont. L.R. 47
(C.P., Pa. 1885).
17. Scheibel v. Burr, 192 App. Div. 438, 183 N.Y. Supp. 49 (2d Dep't 1920)
Philadelphia Parkway, 250 Pa. 257, 95 At. 429 (1915) ; In re Opening of the
Avenue on the Parkway, 24 Pa. Dist. 184 (1915) ; Widening of Venango Street,
9 Pa. Dist. 651 (1871) ; In re Dist. of the City of Pittsburgh, 2 W. & S. 320 (Pa.
1841).
18. Franklin Street, 14 Pa. Super. 403 (1900).
19. Lancaster v. Kennebec Log Driving Co., 62 Me. 272 (1874).
20. Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. Akron, 210 Fed. 524 (N.D. Ohio 1913),
rev'd on other grounds, 240 U.S. 462 (1915).

21. Warren v. Spencer Water Co., 143 Mass. 9, 8 N.E. 606 (1886).
22. Willink v. United States, 240 U.S. 572 (1915).

23. Dep't of Public Works and Buildings v. Wolf, 414 Ill. 386, 111 N.E.2d
322 (1953).
24. May v. Boston, 158 Mass. 21, 32 N.E. 902 (1892).
25. Application of Corp. Counsel of the City of New York (Garden Place), 258
App. Div. 490, 17 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1st Dep't 1940); In re Walton Avenue, 131 App.
Div. 696, 116 N.Y. Supp. 471 (1st Dep't 1909).
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closed for some time. The same argument has been used -to support an
immediate right to damages from the mere passage of an ordinance setting
forth the decision of the city authorities to appropriate certain properties
for municipal operations. 26 Courts adhering to this view are consistent
27
in holding that the filing of a map plotting streets, the passage of an
ordinance which ordered the proper authorities to condemn certain lands
for the construction of a park,28 and the drafting of a resolution stating
29
that lands are to be appropriated for the construction of a freeway, were
sufficient to give the affected property owners an immediate right to compensation. The Supreme Court of Tennessee further extended this line
of reasoning by holding that the affected property owners had a right to
compensation where a pipe line had been located and the pipe lay alongside
the proposed site of the digging, though no actual breaking of ground
had occurred.30
Although, in general, the decisions in this area of the law are inconsistent, all courts meet the constitutional objections by identifying the
point of taking (whatever it might be) as well as the time in which the
right to compensation vests in the landowner. Hence, no constitutional
issue arises concerning the taking of land for public use without compensation. In those cases in which a bond is posted to cover the compensation
assessment which is to be determined at a later date, payment is not
made when the land is taken and title passes, since provisions have already
been made for compensation through the filing of the requisite bond with
Some courts, on the other hand, refuse to recognize
the proper court-s
a passage of title or a taking of private property until the damages have
been both measured and paid.3 2 In these cases the damages are measured
from the date that the court's judgment is entered. The Illinois courts
have held that the title of the new owner will relate back to the date of
33
However, the Minnefiling of the petition concerning the appropriation.
sota courts have held that damages are frozen as of the time that the
action commences, though they do not recognize that a taking is present
26. In re Delafield, 109 Fed. 577 (3d Cir. 1901); Raymond v. Commonwealth,

192 Mass. 486, 78 N.E. 514 (1906) ; Mowry v. Boston, 173 Mass. 425, 53 N.E.
885 (1899) ; McMicken v. Cincinnati, 4 Ohio St. 394 (1854).
27. Matter of Corp. Counsel of the City of New York, 186 App. Div. 669, 174
N.Y. Supp. 816 (1st Dep't 1919).
28. People ex rel. Canavan v. Collis, 20 App. Div. 341, 46 N.Y. Supp. 727
(Ist Dep't 1897).
29. People v. Shultz Co., 268 P.2d 117 (Cal. 1954).
30. Lea v. Louisville & N.R.R., 135 Tenn. 560, 188 S.W. 215 (1916).
31. Fox v. Western Pac. Ry., 31 Cal. 538 (1867) ; Fort Wayne & S. W. Traction Co. v. Fort Wayne & W. Ry., 170 Ind. 49, 83 N.E. 665 (1908) ; Underwood v.
Pennsylvania, M. & S.R.R., 255 Pa. 553, 99 Atl. 64 (1916) ; In re Southern New
England R.R., 39 R.I. 468, 98 Atl. 99 (1916).
32. San Francisco & San Jose R.R. v. Mahoney, 29 Cal. 112 (1865) ; Chicago
Park Dist. v. Downey Coal Co., 1 Ill.2d 54, 115 N.E.2d 223 (1953) ; Kansas City
So. Ry. v. Second Street Improvement Co., 256 Mo. 386, 166 S.W. 296 (1914).
33. Chicago Park Dist. v. Downey Coal Co., I Ill.2d 54, 115 N.E.2d 223
(1953).
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until the damages are ascertained and paid. 4 Other courts have held
that an entry on private property to survey the area or to ascertain its
applicability to the proposed project or improvement is not considered a
taking, provided that such entry is reasonably necessary, not continued
for too long a time, and accompanied by no serious damage to the property. 35 This approach is consistent with the reasoning of the majority of
decisions. Yet, an 1851 Missouri case reached a contrary result in a fact
situation similar to tha; in which the property was surveyed.8 6 Where
damage is caused by the examiner or surveyor, or where the statutory
restrictions on such entry are not complied with, the property owner has
a cause of action for such violations.8 7 In these cases the courts will look
behind the technical application of the law to determine in an equitable
manner if a taking of property has occurred. This result is clearly illustrated in a New Jersey decision in which the court ruled that a taking had
occurred when a shaft was sunk and then abandoned in accordance with
an examination proceeding to test ground for the location of one terminus
of a tunnel.38
B.
Exercise of Eminent Domain Power by Railroads.
The question of when a taking occurs and the corresponding right of
compensation vests, when railroads are exercising their sovereign-granted
condemnation powers, seems to be founded on different considerations
than those governing the exercise of this power by the sovereign itself.
Since the statutes granting this power to the railroads require the filing
of a proposed road plan, courts rely rather heavily on this factor in deciding the time at which a taking is effected. This is of particular importance when property values are fluctuating since the point at which the
taking is held to occur is the point at which the value of the land is determined. Some courts, particularly those of Pennsylvania, hold that the
filing of a location by the railroad and the presentment of the statutorilyrequired bond to the court constitute a taking, thus demanding compensation.3 9 The Pennsylvania courts have further held that the railroad ob34. Duluth Transfer R.R. v. Northern Pac. R.R., 51 Minn. 218, 53 N.W. 366
(1892).
35. Robinson v. Southern Cal. Ry., 129 Cal. 8, 61 Pac. 947 (1900); Marshall
v. Niagara Springs Orchard Co., 22 Idaho 144, 125 Pac. 208 (1912) Winslow v.
Gifford, 60 Mass. 327 (1850) ; Orr v. Quimby, 54 N.H. 590 (1874); Edwards v.
Law, 63 App. Div. 451, 71 N.Y. Supp. 1097 (2d Dep't 1901).
36. Walther v. Warner, 25 Mo. 277 (1851).
37. Robinson v. Southern Cal. Ry., 129 Cal. 8, 61 Pac. 947 (1900); Marshall
Winslow
v. Niagara Springs Orchard Co., 22 Idaho 144, 125 Pac. 208 (1912)
v. Gifford, 60 Mass. 327 (1850) ; Orr v. Quimby, 54 N.H. 590 (1874) ; Edwards v.
Law, 63 App. Div. 451, 71 N.Y. Supp. 1097 (2d Dep't 1901).
38. Morris and Essex R.R. v. Hudson Tunnel R.R., 25 N.J. Eq. 384 (Ch. 1874).
39. Fox v. Western Pac. Ry., 31 Cal. 538 (1867) ; Fort Wayne & S.W.
Traction Co. v. Fort Wayne & W. Ry., 170 Ind. 49, 83 N.E. 665 (1908) ; Underwood v. Pennsylvania, M. & S.R.R., 255 Pa. 553, !. Atl. 64 (1916) ; Schonhardt
v. Pennsylvania R.R.. 216 Pa. 224, 65 Atl. 543 (1907) ; Graham v. Pittsburgh &
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tains a conditional title, good against all but the real owner, upon filing
the location. This conditional title ripens into a complete title upon the
filing of the bond to cover the damages to the injured landowner. 4 0 The
Pennsylvania doctrine freezes compensation valuation at the time of the
filing of the location, 41 though the landowner would have no cause of
action for damages until the bond is filed. At that time the railroad
would perfect its title. The Massachusetts courts have stated that the
filing of the location by the railroad is an assertion of the latter's rights
against the land and such action is prima facie evidence of a taking of the
property in question and damages may be assessed as of that date; 42 but
in Illinois and Indiana, where condemnation and appropriation proceedings
are regulated by statute, the courts rule that a taking occurs when a petition for the commencement of such proceedings is filed,4 and compensation is reckoned as of that date. Maine, which allows occupation before
compensation is paid, has held that where the railroad fails to perfect its
its occupation will be considered tortious
title within a reasonable time,
44
from the date of such entry.
Legislation creating the power of eminent domain necessary to the
construction of canals is similar to the railroad provisions and usually
requires the filing of a location. Under such a provision the date of filing
has been held to constitute a taking in the eyes of the courts, and compensation is measured from that time.45 However, Ohio has not considered these statutes in the same light and holds that the actual construction of the waterway must be commenced before a taking is accomplished
46
and the property owner has a right to compensation.
C.
Condemnation by the Federal Government.
The statutory provisions providing for the appropriation of private
property by the federal government require the filing of a petition of
47
appropriation including a complete description of the land affected.
When this is accomplished and the estimated compensation is deposited
L.E. R.R., 145 Pa. 504, 22 Atl. 983 (1891) ; Crider v. Pittsburgh, H. B. & New Castle

Ry., 54 Pa. Super. 587 (1913) ; Speer v. Monongahela R.R., 22 Pa. Dist. 292

(1912) ; In re Southern New England R.R., 39 R.I. 468, 98 Atl. 99 (1916).
40. Underwood v. Pennsylvania, M. & S.R.R., 255 Pa. 553, 99 Atl. 64 (1916);
Speer v. Monongahela R.R., 22 Pa. Dist. 292 (1912).
41. Underwood v. Pennsylvania, M. & S.R.R., 255 Pa. 553, 99 Att. 64 (1916).
42. Hampton Paint and Chemical Co. v. Springfield, Athal & N.E. R.R., 124
Mass. 118 (1877) ; Davidson v. Boston & Me. R.R., 57 Mass. 91 (1840).
43. Chicago v. McCausland, 379 Ill. 602, 41 N.E.2d 745 (1942) ; Harshberger
v. Midland R.R., 131 Ind. 177, 30 N.E. 1083 (1892).
44. Nichols v. Somerset & Kennebec R.R., 43 Me. 356 (1857).
45. Briggs v. Cape Cod Ship Canal Co., 137 Mass. 71 (1884) ; Van Alstine v.
Belden, 41 App. Div. 123, 58 N.Y. Supp. 521 (4th Dep't 1899).
46. Haynes v. Jones, 91 Ohio St. 197, 110 N.E. 469 (1915).
47. 46 STAT. 1421 (1831), 40 U.S.C. §258 (1952).
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with the authorities prescribed, the title to the land vests immediately in
the United States; nor can anything delay this vesting of title in the government once these steps are taken. 43 The federal government is permitted to occupy the land prior to the final judgment setting forth the
amount of compensation to be allowed. 49 However, by pursuing this
course of conduct, the government becomes irrevocably bound to pay the
amount of compensation that is determined by the court at a later date. 0
Where one disagrees with the valuation that is put on the land by the
sovereign, there are various procedures for review. Typical is that prescribed for parties dealing with the Atomic Energy Commission. When
a property owner disagrees with the amount of compensation allowed for
lands appropriated for the use of the Commission, the latter group must
deposit seventy-five per cent of the figure they have offered the land owner
with the proper authorities. The Commission then has the right to take
possession of the land subject to any further assessment of compensatory
damages that may be declared by the court.51
The federal provisions are unique in that the Attorney General may
stipulate that certain property which has either been taken, or may be
taken, be excluded from the condemnation proceedings. 2 Thus, where
farm land had been taken, the crops thereon, or part of the acreage, may
be given back to the owner and their worth will not be considered in determining the value of the property taken. 53 To the contrary, state courts
uniformly hold that once land has been taken either by the commencement
of construction, or occupation, of the land in question, the right to compensation vests in the former owner, even though the work is never com54
pleted by the activity or group exercising the condemnation power.

III.
ADDITIONAL FACTORS DETERMINING THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION.

A.
Conduct on the Part of the Landowner.
With respect to eminent domain proceedings by state and municipal
authorities, there are several minor topics that deserve mention. Before
compensatory damages are awarded to a landowner claiming infringement of his property rights, the landowner must show that the defendant
5
has authorized or inflicted the damage for which he now seeks recovery.
48. 46
49.
50.
51.
52.

46

46
68
56

53. 88

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

1422 (1931), 40 U.S.C. §258b (1952).
1422 (1931), 40 U.S.C. §258d (1952).

1422 (1931), 40 U.S.C. §258e (1952).
952, 42 U.S.C.A. §2221 (Supp. 1954).

797 (1942), 40 U.S.C. §258f (1952).
3350 (1942).

CONG. R~c.

54. People ex rel. Utley v. Hayden, 6 Hill. 359 (N.Y. 1844).
55. Red v. Little Rock Ry. & Electric Co., 121 Ark. 71, 180 S.W. 220 (1915)
Ketchum v. City of Monett, 193 Mo. App. 529, 181 S.W. 1064 (1916).
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Moreover, where one is not content with the assessment award, an appeal
by the property owner will not change the date of taking, nor the date
from which his damages will be measured. 6 Damages may not be recovered by a property owner who has built on his land subsequent to the
enactment of the ordinance or statute providing for a change in street
level, though prior to the changing of such street level.5 7 However, where

the courts do not apply the rule that a taking occurs immediately upon the
passage of an ordinance concerning the appropriation of private property,
and the land is subsequently improved, the courts have held that such
improvements must be compensated for by the condemning group.5 8 However, where the property owner acted in bad faith, and has been guilty of
"house planting," the additional compensation will not be allowed.5 9
B.
Divided Property Interests.
Divided interests in property present another consideration in determining the proper amount of compensation. Where the unit of government exercising the right of eminent domain obtains a deed from the life
tenant, the damages which result from the filing of the petition must be
assessed for the interest of each minor remainderman as he comes of age.60
A Louisiana court has held that when a minor's guardian together with
the party appropriating the land waived certain proceedings, such action
being fatal to the appropriator's claim of title, the minor was not bound
thereby and was allowed to recover compensation from the date of entry.6 '
C.
Condemnation Agreements.
An interesting situation arose in Kansas when the former owner of
land taken by a railroad under an agreement, claimed that the latter had
breached the contract and brought condemnation proceedings. The court
stated that, if in fact the promised consideration had not been given by the
railroad, the compensation under the condemnation proceedings would be
measured as of the date of entry by the railroad. 62 In a similar situation
a municipality occupied certain property under an agreement providing
for arbitration by a court if the parties could not arrive at a satisfactory
56. Shannahan v. City of Waterbury, 63 Conn. 420, 28 Ati. 611 (1893) ; Board
of Commissioners of Fairfield County v. Richardson, 122 S.C. 58, 114 S.E. 632
(1922).
57. Bourland v. City of Jackson, 196 S.W. 1045 (Mo. App. 1917).
58. Maher v. Commonwealth, 291 Mass. 343, 197 N.E. 78 (1934) ; New York
Central & H.R.R. v. State, 37 App. Div. 57, 55 N.Y. Supp. 685 (3d Dep't 1899)
Keane v. Portland, 115 Ore. 1, 235 Pac. 677 (1925).
59. Matter of the City of New York, 196 N.Y. 255 (1909).
60. Stahl v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pgh. Ry., 262 Pa. 493, 106 Atl. 65 (1919).
61. Jacobs v. Kansas City, S. & G. Ry., 134 La. 389, 64 So. 150 (1914).
62. Wier v. St. Louis, Ft. S. & W. R.R., 40 Kan. 130, 19 Pac. 316 (1888).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1956

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1956], Art. 12
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

1.

figure for the measure of compensation. In that case damages were
awarded from the date of the trial,3 the court reasoning that the municipality was not a tortfeasor and that the claim had been unliquidated until
that date.

IV.
CONCLUSION.

As a result of the growing number of problems faced by the various
states in constructing modern super-highways, legislation in this area of
the law is very likely. The problems arising under such large-scale condemnation programs are similar to those faced by the railroads and the
federal government, and totally foreign to the problems and considerations
encountered when eminent domain powers are exercised on the county or
municipal level. There is no thought of simply revising or modifying existing building lines when a turnpike is planned. Large expanses of land
in different counties are appropriated for the construction of these highways. Thus, the theories and the reasoning of the courts where eminent
domain powers were exercised on the municipal or county level are of
little value. Consequently, it is apparent that neither of the approaches
used by the courts to determine the point at which the taking has occurred
are satisfactory for such large-scale activities. It is submitted that the
better rule might be an admixture of the various approaches. First, the
date of taking and the date on which the compensation award is measured
must be identified to satisfy constitutional requirements. Secondly, the
landowner and the speculator must not be given the opportunity to profit
at public expense; but at the same time the landowner must be certain of
the date of taking and fixing of compensation so that he will not improve
his property at the risk of having it valued at a point prior to the improvement. Thirdly, the award itself must be just. It is therefore suggested
that the date of taking and the valuation date should be the date on which
the provision for the exercise of the sovereign power is filed, or in the
alternative, the date of passage of the statute relating to the appropriation
of the land in question. There should be an additional requirement that
a bond be posted immediately. As a further safeguard, the statute should
include a clause providing for the situation when the land is not actively
appropriated or occupied within a stated period or when the required bond
is not posted within a reasonable time; in such a case, the date of the
taking and measurement of damages would be fixed at the time when the
land was actively appropriated or occupied, and the required bond was
posted with the proper authorities. It is submitted that the adoption of
this legislation, including the shifting clause, would prevent many of the
injustices occurring under the traditional standards in use today.
Neale F. Hooley
63. Union Exploration Co. v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 104 Colo.
109, 89 P.2d 257 (1939).
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